This post was rather unfair. It is eternally fashionable to deflate the reputations of "great men," but it oftentimes leads to some predictable errors. The most common of these is to err by overstating their influence. The Metternich parallel is apt; for nearly a hundred years historians blamed him for a whole host of things he had no control over (indeed, in his correspondence Metternich lamented his lack of domestic influence).

As you acknowledge in your comment, Henry Kissinger cannot be held responsible for all of those subsequent developments that have since changed the Sino-American dynamic. Kissinger did not hold a gun to the heads of American politicians and force them to underinvest in American education or stop them from pursuing any kind of coherent economic policy. He was the head of the state department for a period nearly forty years ago. His purview in that capacity was limited. In the context of Cold War politics, and even regarding Sino-American trade relations trade in the last twenty years, Kissinger's opening was beneficial for American interests. Trade with China has made us substantially wealthier in material terms.

Cracks have begun to show in America's economic soundness, but those cracks are not a result of Chinese successes but of American failures. Trade is not a zero sum game; growing Chinese wealth does not inherently result in American penury. The villains in that equation are closer to home, as you've often written.

In the event that American decline continues alongside Chinese growth, it still would be incorrect to call Kissinger's opening an error. To do so could be compared to blaming the builders after a house is burned down by arsonists. These kind of assessments will perhaps predominate for a time, but as Kissinger rehabilitated Metternich's reputation so surely will some young mind rehabilitate Kissinger's. Though it can take decades, genuinely effective statesmen end up with the reputation they deserve.

@PECHORIN: Excellent!!!!

China, which is to say Mao, sought to revive relations with the United States as a means of avoiding a potentially fatal confrontation with the Soviet Union and its massive nuclear arsenal. Mao had no thought of doing any of the things China has done since 1978, and while some other Chinese did they did not say so aloud while Mao was alive.

I sympathize with some of Prestowitz's sentiments, expressed on this blog from time to time, and often agree with the arguments he makes. However, he is too apt to regard the question of China with a kind of hopeless pessimism. The pessimism I understand, even if I don't always share it. It's the hopelessness I regard as unworthy.

The suggestion that rapprochement with China led to America's decline is risible, as PECHORIN points out. But his pointing to our neglect of education and short-sighted economic policies as alternative causes for our decline in the period since opening relations with China raises a thought.

Perhaps winning two world wars and gaining ground in the Cold War brought a sense of security and quiescence and America grew soft. Weary of the fight and eager to enjoy the good things in life we relaxed. (And why not - we deserve it.)

Meanwhile a stabilized China rediscovered the advantages of industry and trade and was only too happy to toil and sweat to provide America with those good things at seductively affordable prices. And the focus of their policies and solidarity of their people helped them achieve remarkable economic growth. (Of course there have been various ways that focus and solidarity have been effected and I'm glad I didn't experience all of them.)

But China is not tired yet. The idea that life doesn't have to be starvation and misery is new to so many of them. The newly discovered pleasures of even small material reward along with the fresh memory of extreme poverty and suffering keeps them working hard. They don't need to relax; that's too much like the torpidity of destitution.

China's strength frightens us. We don't really know them - how can we trust them? Don't they jail people who leak government secrets to the press? Don't they torture perceived enemies in secret jails? Don't they mistreat their ethnic minorities, taking control of their lands? Don't they use slave labor? A country with a history of doing all that must be a threat.

So how do we get our power back? How do we get our work ethic back? Do we incite fear of China's growing economic strength? Should we denounce the instigation of a cordial relationship?

Of all the things one might choose to criticize Kissinger for, making friends with China is a curious choice.

Henry Kissinger cannot be held responsible for all of those subsequent developments that have since changed the Sino-American dynamic. Kissinger did not hold a gun to the heads of American politicians and force them to underinvest sázkové kanceláre in American education or stop them from pursuing any kind of coherent economic policy. He was the head of the state department for a period nearly forty years ago. His purview in that capacity was limited. In the context of Cold War politics, and even regarding Sino-American trade relations trade in the last twenty years.